STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT.. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have all been key U.S. security partners since U.S. officials mobilized regional and global allies to launch a military campaign to reverse Iraq’s 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In the years since, and particularly following the U.S.-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, Iran has emerged as a paramount threat to U.S. interests and the Gulf states. The leaders of one of the smallest and least wealthy Gulf states, the Kingdom of Bahrain, sense the greatest threat from the Islamic Republic of Iran, more than any other Gulf or Arab state does.
In 1981 and 1996, the government accused Iranian leaders of organized failed coups against Bahrain’s leaders, and Bahraini officials blamed Iran for stoking the majority Shia Muslim population of the Kingdom to rise up against the country’s leadership during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. U.S. and global officials broadly criticized the government’s crackdown on Shia protesters, while also later designating as terrorists and imposing sanctions on Iran-backed underground groups – particularly the Al Ashtar Brigades – they acknowledged were conducting violent attacks on Bahrain’s police and security forces.
To perhaps a greater extent than any other Gulf or Arab state, the government of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has placed itself under a U.S.-led security umbrella, setting few, if any, conditions on the partnership. The King and his son, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, have not openly displayed any doubts about the durability and extent of the U.S. commitment to secure the region that their allies, de-facto leader of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation President Mohammad bin Zayid Al Nahyan (MBZ), have expressed. Even though many U.S. policies have stirred anger among the country’s population – Shias, as well as the Sunni minority that dominates the government – Bahrain’s leadership has not placed any conditions on U.S. regional naval command assets, whose headquarters Bahrain has hosted since 1946.
As headquarters for the naval component of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), referred to as “NAVCENT,” Bahrain is crucial to U.S. efforts to contain Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” partners, including the Houthi movement in Yemen. NAVCENT assets have taken the lead in multilateral efforts to try to deter and degrade the Houthi’s efforts to attack Red Sea shipping by intercepting weapons and technology shipments to the Houthis from their principal backers in Tehran.
Bahrain has been the only Arab state to openly join the maritime security mission — Operation Prosperity Guardian — formed in December 2023 to help shield commercial shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi missile and armed drone attacks. The operation has the participation of 20 countries, of whom 12 have been publicly named, including Bahrain. Some reports indicate that Saudi Arabia and the UAE might be contributing to the mission as well but seek to keep their participation private to avoid triggering a resumption of Houthi attacks on their energy and civilian infrastructure. The two also seek to avoid risking further instability in the Red Sea, where many of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects exist. In addition, Saudi and Emirati leaders calculate that openly backing U.S. military efforts against the Houthis would reignite tensions with Iran. Both countries have sought to improve relations with Tehran over the past four years. Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a formal agreement restoring relations in March 2023.
Not wanting to defy its Gulf allies by resisting reduced tensions with Tehran, in late June, Bahrain’s leaders agreed to begin talks to restore political relations between the two countries, which broke in 2016 in solidarity with Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic row with Iran. The rapprochement initiative was announced following a meeting between Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani and the acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani during al-Zayani’s visit to Iran. Al-Zayani was in Iran to participate in an Asian Cooperation Dialogue summit. The meeting followed Bahrain’s sending of a request via Russia in early June to re-establish diplomatic relations with Iran. In May, Bahrain’s King Hamad said the country looked forward to improved relations with Iran.
Even before the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel that set off the war in Gaza and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, U.S. officials recognized Bahrain’s centrality to the U.S. security architecture in the Gulf by signing, in September 2023, a bilateral “Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA).” The agreement goes beyond existing U.S. security pacts with Bahrain and the other Gulf states by committing the United States to defend Bahrain if attacked. According to the agreement’s text: “Any external aggression or threat of external aggression against the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of any of the Parties [United States and Bahrain] shall be a matter of grave concern to the other Parties. In the event of external aggression or the threat of external aggression against one Party, the Parties shall, in accordance with their respective constitutions and laws, immediately meet at the most senior levels to determine additional defense needs and to develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses as decided upon by the Parties, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms.”
The C-SIPA goes far beyond the vague and non-binding U.S. security commitment to Bahrain encapsulated in a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1991, signed several months after the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait. In contrast to the DCA, the new pact contains provisions for expanded economic cooperation. A clause in the C-SIPA states the two countries will: “Identify strategic investment opportunities that benefit more than one of the Parties, develop projects that enhance bilateral and multilateral economic and trade cooperation, such as in the areas of supply chain resilience and infrastructure, and support economic development globally.”
The U.S. decision to promise protection for Bahrain also reflects Bahrain’s alignment with other Arab states, including fellow Gulf state and close ally UAE, to join the Abraham Accords initiative and open formal diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020. U.S. officials appreciate that Bahrain’s leaders have continued to uphold their commitments under the Accords even though the vast majority of the Bahrain public has denounced Israeli actions in Gaza. Some large anti-Israel demonstrations have taken place in Manama since October 7, calling on the King to break relations with Israel. At the same time, Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have denounced the government’s use of oppressive tactics to repress Palestine solidarity protestors. U.S. officials appear to expect that Bahrain will reciprocate the strong U.S. support for the country by committing some security forces to an interim, multilateral peacekeeping force in Gaza that might deploy after an Israeli withdrawal. In late July, the UAE became the first Arab state to signal a willingness to commit forces to a Gaza peacekeeping operation.
Still, as have some of their Gulf allies, Bahraini officials have risked criticism from U.S. leaders by expanding relations with China. U.S. leaders have not opposed Gulf state efforts to broaden relations with Beijing, but they have conditioned some sales of advanced U.S. technology, particularly military equipment, on firm commitments to prevent China from gaining access to it. To that extent, there are concerns that, during King Hamad’s visit to Beijing in May to attend a China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, he signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with China. During the visit, Bahrain’s Mumtalakat sovereign wealth fund and the China Investment Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding to explore mutual investment opportunities. In 2018, Bahrain signed a memorandum of understanding to participate in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the other hand, no specific transactions between Bahrain and China have evoked public U.S. objections.
