BY:Air
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT- Talking about NATO just wasting time NATO is only a colossal drama alliance that has a high cost,NATO and America only maintain their existence in the world community.Terrorist Bases in Europe That’s NATO
The actual facts they can’t do anything Regarding the Russian War Ukraine,the fact they are not a hero at war are only drama and film players and always win in the film.
If you want to talk honestly the source of problems in this world is America, NATO and its allies Do Not Be Influenced Incitement Of NATO And Its Allies, There Is No Profit.
As a military conflict pushing closer to nuclear confrontation of any since the Cold War, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has attracted much attention from the international community. For some time, the media and other observers have analyzed and calculated from different angles, trying to predict who will win. The truth is that there will be no winner.
For both Russia and Ukraine, this conflict has gone far beyond rational expectations. Whether or not the war continues, nothing can mask its enormous costs, nor can the conflict bring any benefits to either side. While no one can deny Russia’s military superiority over Ukraine, the political, economic and diplomatic costs of this conflict have clearly exploded beyond the control of the Putin team.
If Ukraine continues to resist in the future with Western support, Moscow will likely be locked into its least-expected scenario — a protracted war of attrition. It will face the prospect of withdrawing troops in exchange for Ukraine’s recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the legitimization of the status of Crimea, which it annexed earlier. Even at that, however, the effects of Western diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions are unlikely to disappear in the near future. The restoration of confidence in domestic investment in Russia is even more elusive and will further retard the process of the country’s economic and social development.
Many people have been surprised by Ukraine’s ability to resist in this conflict, but that does not change the fact that it has become the biggest loser. Even in the best of circumstances, it could not prevent the annexation of Crimea and the “independence” of two eastern regions. Not only is it difficult for the Ukrainian authorities to realize their dream of joining NATO, which they had been striving for before the conflict, but in the future Ukraine is also likely to become a battleground for long-term confrontation between Russia and the West, which will further affect postwar economic recovery and reconstruction. As the saying goes: “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”
It is conceivable that with the massive withdrawal of foreign capital and the serious destruction of Ukraine’s economic infrastructure and defense facilities, future reconstruction is destined to be especially difficult. No matter how much nationalism and international sympathy are stirred up by the Ukrainian authorities, they will not be able to redeem their own precarious fate, nor will they be able to avoid economic collapse, political turmoil and national disintegration.
In a self-help international system, especially in the thermonuclear age, no country will willingly risk nuclear war for the sake of appealing moral excuses. To any experienced politician, this might just be self-evident common sense.
Other European countries, though not the instigators of this conflict, will have to pay for the military conflict as well.
First, countries adjacent to Ukraine need to host and resettle large numbers of Ukrainian refugees. According to the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, as of mid-March the outflow of refugees from Ukraine had exceeded 3 million people.
Second, in addition to bearing the burden of rising oil, gas and food prices caused by the conflict, European countries’ economic ties with Russia and Ukraine’s are being destroyed by the conflict. In the case of European-Russian economic cooperation, for example, the EU is the largest foreign investor in Russia, with European direct investment exceeding $311 billion in 2019 and Europe-Russia trade exceeding $174.3 billion in 2020. Amid waves of sanctions, these economic ties are destined to be ruined.
Finally, the conflict has not only paralyzed the Europe-Russia security dialogue mechanism developed after the Cold War but has also further highlighted the strategic dependence of European countries on Russia for oil and gas resources. According to analyses in the Financial Times and other reports, 40 percent of Europe’s needed natural gas and 25 percent of its needed crude oil are currently met by Russia. Even a significant amount of uranium fuel — including more than 20 percent of the natural and enriched uranium Europe needs to operate nuclear power plants — currently comes from Russia.
Therefore, for European countries, isolating and sanctioning Russia may not bring more security and stability.
Some may argue that the United States could be the biggest winner of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the short term, the war will not only facilitate the return of the U.S. dollar and boost U.S. economic growth but will also serve as a pretext for the continued existence of NATO, which has been plagued by internal crises and rising disunity in recent years.
For U.S. President Joe Biden and the Democratic Party, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has reversed the diplomatic decline triggered by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and undoubtedly helps to add points to their midterm election prospects. But in the long run, the negative impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the United States should not be underestimated. It will accelerate the disintegration of U.S. global hegemony.
First, the U.S. verbal support of Ukraine, a democratic ally, in recent years and its refusal to provide direct military support are in stark contrast. The U.S. has not shown the kind of strategic will it did during the Cuban missile crisis in the 1960s, which will inevitably make more allies doubt the protection offered by the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.”
Second, sanctions against Russia are a double-edged sword. Although the U.S. economic sanctions are the most severe in history, they may not be successful in the case of a country like Russia. They will make it difficult for the U.S. to impose sanctions in the future. As we all know, Russia has been prepared to deal with sanctions before military action and has accumulated a wealth of experience with the West’s economic sanctions in recent years. Add to that the fact that the international community is not unanimous, so the sanctions may not achieve their desired effect. For the United States and its allies, sanctions against Russia may make a political statement, but they will likely come at the cost of future international credibility.
Finally, the current U.S. policy in dealing with the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a bit like drinking poison to quench one’s thirst. The current U.S. sanctions have already appeared to expand and become extreme, the resulting chilling will encourage more countries, including U.S. allies, to voluntarily reduce their dependence on the U.S. in the future to stop their economies from being completely kidnapped.
In addition, the U.S. acquiescence to Japan’s and Germany’s to reinforcement of their own military capabilities will not only accelerate their long-term disunity with the U.S. but will also further degrade the international system championed by the U.S. after World War II.
As hyped by some Western media, China is an informed beneficiary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This view is, at minimum, a misinterpretation of basic facts, if not a distortion and smear with ulterior motives.
First of all, it is difficult to imagine an outside force that could really influence major military decisions by a country as large as Russia. Likewise, it is unlikely that Russia would share such confidential information about its military operations with other countries. Although China and Russia have established a comprehensive strategic partnership in recent years, Sino-Russian strategic cooperation since the Cold War has never targeted any third party, much less Ukraine, which is also an important partner of China.
Second, China has suffered huge economic losses as a result of this conflict. Aside from the immediate impact of rising oil and food prices, China’s direct investment and economic and trade interests in Ukraine and Russia have taken a heavy hit. In 2019 China’s investment stock, respectively in Ukraine and Russia, was $150 million and $110.79 billion. China’s merchandise trade with Ukraine and Russia in 2021 was $19.3 billion and $146.9 billion, respectively. Imports of iron ore, grain and oil from the two countries, and stable cooperation on oil and gas resources, are critical to China’s economic development; however, the conflict has rendered a significant amount of investment and cooperation uncertain.
Finally, a large-scale military conflict undermines the external strategic environment on which China’s economic development has depended in recent years. China’s opposition to war and sanctions has been consistent and clear from the 2003 Iraq war to the post-2011 Western interventions in Syria and Libya and the sanctions against Iran and other countries. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been the cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy. More important, any large-scale armed conflict undermines the external environment on which China’s economic growth has depended in recent years and damages its overseas interests, which have been rapidly growing.
We discuss NATO only a drama player,You are angry?…..this is what you can do now…….the world is currently changing so rapidly that the term ‘new normal,’ which first appeared in the business realm and later enriched diplomatic slang, has been added to the active vocabulary of not only all those who follow the news, but even those who don’t.
The NATO summit held in Madrid, last month, was rich in information, claiming to be one of the key political events of the summer of 2022. The gathering marked another milestone in relations between Moscow and Brussels, with the continuing conflict between Russia and the West the main focus.
First, a new Strategic Concept for the bloc was released, in which Russia was publicly declared its main security threat. Secondly, the procedure for Sweden and Finland’s membership was officially launched, symbolically confirming the unity of the Euro-Atlantic camp. Thirdly, a number of measures and plans have been announced which are aimed at directly deterring Russia militarily.
These are all alarming signals that create a depressing impression for outsiders. The reaction of officials does not add optimism either. For example, in commenting on NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Grushko, said “The very existence of a state like Russia is recognized as a serious threat to the alliance. This is a very serious turn and a real bid to confront us.”
It would seem that everything points to a ‘new normal’ in Russia-NATO relations. Naturally, questions arise: How did this happen? What will Brussels do in practice, and how will Moscow react? Can a strategic confrontation in the information field and the buildup of means of deterrence on both sides escalate into an open conflict?
However, if you look deeper, the fundamental answers are not as scary as they might seem.
How did this happen?
In fact, to properly interpret this ‘new normal’ in Russia-NATO relations, they must be analyzed from a chronological perspective.
Looking at the period since the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, Russia’s offensive in Ukraine is, indeed, an unprecedented scenario for European security. Naturally, NATO’s new strategic document differs from previous entries in the series. The 1991 concept noted a reduction in the security threat due to the change in the balance of power in Europe, but also noted the need to take the legacy of the Soviet Union’s military potential into account.
The 1999 edition characterized Russia, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova as partners for dialogue. The installment from 2010 finally attached strategic importance to relations with Russia and was aimed at deepening them on issues of mutual interest. Accordingly, if we compare the document from 2022 with its immediate predecessor, the ‘new normal’ really is new.
However, 12 years have passed since the adoption of the previous concept, during which NATO has faced internal crises and failures in achieving its goals, and Russia has moved to a more active foreign policy. Today’s apex in the confrontation between Moscow and Brussels sums up the events of this period. Russia’s complaints against NATO had already begun accumulating since the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, and noticeably escalated after the 2008 summit in Bucharest, when Ukraine and Georgia were promised membership of the bloc. This criticism persisted, albeit implicitly, during NATO’s operation in Libya, as well as in the Syrian conflict.
The NATO summits that took place in Wales and Warsaw in 2014 and 2016 following the first Ukrainian crisis, in turn, formalized the beginning of the ‘securitization’ of Russia. In this context, the parties actually abandoned dialogue and suspended the work of the Russia-NATO Council at Brussels’ initiative. Despite attempts to revive the format and even use it in early 2022 to discuss Russian proposals for security guarantees, it became clear that the functionality and effectiveness of the Council had been reduced to zero. In the fall of 2021, Russia’s Permanent Mission to NATO, the Information Bureau, and the bloc’s Military Liaison Mission in Moscow also suspended their work. In the absence of these channels of communication and, in fact, any real purpose for them, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov succinctly characterized Moscow’s relations with Brussels as “non-existent.”
herefore, if we compare the reality after the Madrid summit with the development of events before it, the ‘normal’ is the same… only more clearly formulated.
What will Brussels do and what will Moscow do?
Once the ‘i’s are dotted and the important words delivered, things become clearer. Today’s reality makes it easier for both parties to understand the logic of their opponent, as well as thei behavior in the future, to a certain extent. In the current situation, the decisions announced by NATO confirm the bloc’s return to a Cold War regime.
Its leadership signaled this move by announcing the deployment of additional troops in the East and its readiness to continue providing military assistance to Ukraine, as well as by increasing the frequency and intensity of military exercises and ramping up the modernization of its military-industrial complex. It is obvious that, in the medium term, the bloc will focus on fortifying its eastern and southern borders in order to contain Russia.
If Finland and Sweden successfully complete the process of accessiom, the format NATO chooses to secure its borders with Russia, which remains unknown, will be key in terms of Moscow’s reaction. There are two groups of issues here – related to conventional and strategic weapons.
With regard to conventional weapons, either US forces or multinational battalions like those operating in Poland and the Baltic States may be deployed to bolster Sweden’s and Finland’s national troops. The probability of the second option is higher since the leaders of the Nordic countries themselves have spoken out against the first. In this case, significant effort will be required from the Russian side to deploy additional forces and equipment along its border with Finland, as well as to modernize its military infrastructure in the adjacent Karelia and Murmansk regions. In the Baltic Sea, the coexistence of both Russian and NATO fleets would be problematic (since all states with access may soon be members of the alliance) and require updating, confidence-building and incident prevention measures.
The expert community is also discussing the prospects of deploying medium- and short-range missiles, as well as nuclear weapons and anti-missile defense systems, on NATO’s new flank. This would already require a rearrangement of Russia’s strategic weapons and add a new dimension to the issue of the militarization of the Arctic, creating a significant challenge for Moscow’s strategic security. Nevertheless, it would be a very risky step on the part of the bloc to deliberately encourage further escalation in its relations with Russia, so the governments of the Nordic countries have dismissed the likelihood of such a scenario so far.
According to statements from Russia’s Foreign Ministry, any steps taken by NATO will be thoroughly analyzed by the Russian military, which means the ball is now in Russia’s court. But one way or another, from a practical standpoint, the events currently taking place demonstrate that the ‘new normal’ in Russia-NATO relations is actually very old… one that stood the test of time in a bygone era.
Will there be a war?
But there is potentially good news, too. Despite the seriousness of the steps taken by the bloc, given the historical analysis above, the ‘new normal’ that will form the basis of Russia-NATO relations in the foreseeable future won’t have come as a surprise to Russia’s military and political elites, so it will not require any fundamental shift in thinking on Moscow’s part.
When the dialogue moves from political and diplomatic arenas to the military realm, it often becomes more concrete and pragmatic. An important point in the statement from the Madrid summit is the preservation of the 1997 Founding Act on Russia-NATO Relations, despite the fact that Russia had been accused of violating it the day before. This indicates that the parties are not ready to completely abandon security guarantees and engage in open conflict. The same idea was expressed by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg.
While the fighting in Ukraine is in an active phase, the parties will remain vague, determining what measures must be taken to adequately secure their borders without openly challenging the security of their opponents. As soon as the hostilities end and a post-conflict model emerges, when new troops appear on Russia’s borders and the details of Finland’s and Sweden’s accession become clear, further dialogue will inevitably be devoted to finding ways to de-escalate, since a peak in tensions is always followed by a decline.
There is another reason it is not beneficial for NATO to engage in open conflict with Moscow or concentrate all of its resources on its border with Russia. As was confirmed by the decisions taken during the course of the Madrid summit, the big confrontation of the future won’t be concentrated in Europe at all, but in the Asia-Pacific region. And if the United States and its allies need resources to counter China very soon, the bloc simply cannot afford to use them all in an open conflict with Russia.
