STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT. Russian authorities officially confirmed the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the infamous leader of the Wagner Group, who was killed in a plane crash over Russia last week, along with several other high-ranking leaders of the mercenary group. Those on board included Dmitri Utkin, a former Russian special forces officer and one of Wagner’s original founding members. Most analysts speculate that Prigozhin and his top lieutenants were killed in retaliation for the mutiny launched by the group in late June, which, although eventually aborted, caused great embarrassment to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prigozhin’s killing was a deliberate act orchestrated by the Kremlin, designed to reinforce the notion that anybody who crosses Putin is marked for death. While Russia may seek to float various conspiracy theories and disinformation surrounding the circumstances of the plane crash, this was no accident—the death of Prigozhin and other senior Wagnerites is likely the first major move by Putin to reassert control over Wagner and bring its activities more closely under the Kremlin’s watchful eye.
Prigozhin was killed two months to the day of the coup, and amidst a flurry of other activity related to Russia’s military posture and force structure . Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan warlord backed by Moscow, received the Russian deputy defense minister last week. Meanwhile, General Sergei Surovikin, a high-ranking Russian military officer believed to be close to Prighozin and who had not been seen much since the coup, was relieved of his command of Russia’s Aerospace Forces. Putin had likely been planning his move against Prigozhin since the aborted coup, lulling the Wagner boss into a false sense of security before making his move. Just days before Prigozhin’s plane went down, the details of which are still being debated (the New York Times reports that the U.S. government believes the plane was brought down by an explosion on board, possibly a bomb), he appeared in a video from the Sahel, doubling down on Wagner’s presence in Africa. To be sure, Russia needs what Wagner brings to the table. The question will be whether the group continues its activities under the same name, or is dissolved into smaller, already existing private military companies (PMCs), including Redut, a Russian mercenary force linked to its military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, also known as GRU. Given its focus on clandestine operations, the GRU could be a natural home for the next iteration of Wagner. The GRU has been linked to a number of operations inside Europe, including the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer, as well as covert activities in Moldova, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and elsewhere.
Another possibility is that Wagner remains largely intact, while new leadership is installed to command its operations. The new leadership would have to be pliant to the Kremlin, with no questions about the agenda of its top commanders. Putin will insert someone loyal to him, but this could anger the rank-and-file of Wagner, some of whom might remain fiercely loyal to Prigohzhin. If that is the case, it could lead to domestic blowback within Russia. By executing Prigozhin in a mafia-style assassination, the Russian government could be on the receiving end of backlash from those Wagnerites who believe Prigozhin fought hard to acquire resources, including weapons and ammunition, for the group. Putin is hoping that the majority of Wagner’s forces, in the mold of true mercenaries, will fight for whoever signs their paychecks, but risks abound. So while this move will help Putin consolidate control in the long-run, in the immediate term, he may face further dissent and more civil unrest. Prigozhin had a lot of enemies, but it seems like he had many friends, too. The next Wagner leader will likely be far less visible, less abrasive, and more under the radar compared with Prigozhin, whose torrent of abuse aimed at high-ranking Russian military officials was taking its toll within the Kremlin.
With the recent coup in Niger, Wagner has opportunities to further expand its influence throughout Africa, so Putin will waste little time in taking advantage. He’s just cleaned house of the mutineers and will attempt to integrate Wagner closely under the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow has sought to reassure African leaders that the services that Wagner provides will continue even as the post-Prigozhin landscape continues to take shape. Wagner still has forces, among its most seasoned fighters, stationed in Belarus, although their role in that country is also unclear. Some reporting suggests that these mercenaries are being recruited to sign contracts with the Russian MoD. The future of Wagner seems to be in Africa, where its expeditionary operations and focus on providing muscle in exchange for access to resources is a much better fit for its expertise. Wagner’s role in Ukraine, conventional military combat operations, forced the group to recruit from prisons, a move that vastly transformed the organization and how it operated. Now, with Prigozhin and Utkin gone, Wagner has a clean slate. While much of what is happening remains shrouded in mystery, one thing remains certain—the Kremlin needs Wagner, just as much as Wagner needs the Kremlin. Even without Prigozhin, the mercenaries will continue operating, destabilizing countries, and leaving a bloody trail in their wake.
