STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT-Naypidew. April 24 marked one year since ASEAN leaders signed the Five-Point ASEAN Consensus. As an ASEAN-led initiative, the consensus was widely endorsed and supported by the larger international community, including the United States.
Yet, for a full year, it has failed to make any inroads. Instead, the approach has provided the military junta with a protective shield from effective international action that could have been consequential for the people of Myanmar. Meanwhile, the global preoccupation with the Ukraine crisis has given the junta an additional layer of cover to avoid greater international scrutiny of its heinous crimes.
The Myanmar military’s complete violation of the already deeply flawed Consensus underscores the need for Washington to go beyond the existing ASEAN framework by abandoning the failed plan and instead using the Special Summit as a platform to convince its ASEAN partners to agree to a new multilateral strategy.
The United States should take advantage of this growing frustration to promote a new diplomatic mechanism, both with ASEAN members and other interested parties beyond the Indo-Pacific region.
ASEAN is now scrambling to organize a regional consultation on humanitarian aid distribution in Myanmar through its humanitarian aid center AHA in order to project the appearance of some progress with the points in the consensus.
Washington should not support the AHA Center’s involvement in aid coordination and delivery, which by ASEAN mandate would require the junta’s approval and oversight. Promoting the AHA Center’s humanitarian involvement in Myanmar would give the junta not only the propaganda tool it desperately needs, but also the legitimacy it craves.
Instead, the Biden administration should roll back support for the failed ASEAN consensus and insist on a new approach to humanitarian aid distribution through community-based organizations and civil society networks operating along Thai-Myanmar and India-Myanmar borders, as Myanmar civil society organizations and rights groups have been promoting over the past year.
The United States should also push to urgently broaden current sanctions on Myanmar to include a ban on the sale and transfer of arms and jet fuel to the junta, which has consistently launched indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on civilian targets. The U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit represents a vital opportunity for the Biden administration to advance a Myanmar policy that can meaningfully address the ongoing crisis.
President Joe Biden’s long-promised US-ASEAN summit, which nearly didn’t get off the ground, will take place on 12 and 13 May at the White House. The summit is officially being convened to celebrate 45 years of diplomatic engagement between the United States and the Southeast Asian regional bloc.
It comes after the Biden administration released its rhetorically ambitious but substantively vague Indo-Pacific Strategy, with its crucial economic element — the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) — yet to be defined. Biden has made a point of stressing ASEAN centrality, and for the attending ASEAN leaders this is a chance to set out regional priorities to a superpower whose influence, if receding, is still substantial.
Washington is making a habit of offering economic frameworks for Asia: Obama had his ‘pivot’; Trump his ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’. The IPEF is the latest, and it shares several of the defects common to the genre. It is framed around issues that matter to the United States and not questions of urgency for Asian economies; it reads like a strategy to counter the rise of China; and it is unlikely to outlive the current administration.
Britain’s Foreign Secretary Liz Truss set the cat among the pigeons last week when she suggested that NATO should seek to boost security in the Indo-Pacific region by working with allies like Japan and Australia, and within groups like ASEAN.
For cheerleaders of the re-energized Quad, the recent formation of the AUKUS security pact, and a division of the geopolitical world between democracies and authoritarianism, her remarks were a welcome endorsement of an expansion of the West’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
That will be in play when the U.S. and ASEAN hold a Special Summit in Washington, D.C. – billed as a celebration of “four and a half decades of Dialogue Relations” – on May 12 and 13.
Despite the fact that the six ASEAN member states are Washington’s primary trade partners, many believe the United States will not unveil a big economic cooperation plan at the U.S.-ASEAN Summit. According to analysts, Southeast Asia is seeking guarantees that U.S. military backing for NATO and Ukraine will not undermine the U.S.’s commitments in the Indo-Pacific region. Greg Poling, Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Southeast Asia Program and Maritime Transparency Initiative Chair said, “This is a classic scenario in Southeast Asia. Everything the United States does is neither excessive nor insufficient, but it is never sufficient. This requirement demonstrates how much the region expects the United States to honor its commitments. That has long been a source of concern.” Experts also believe that Washington must convey a strong statement about U.S.-China ties, notably over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s itinerary during this Golden Week holiday is indicative of the country’s role today. He has just concluded a visit to ASEAN members Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. He heads on to Italy and the United Kingdom. As the Asian representative in the Group of Seven, Japan has an important mission to serve as a bridge between the West and ASEAN. Through these meetings, he has warned of the dangers of attempts to change the status quo by force, while not naming Russia directly.
During the latest trip, he and his hosts agreed on the need to establish a cease-fire in Ukraine and to deliver humanitarian aid. Many Asian nations have maintained relations with Russia despite the blatant invasion into Ukraine. Meanwhile, Japan has been calling for countries to join the coalition of nations opposing Russia’s actions, leveraging its security and economic relationships with its Asian friends. Japan’s role as an intermediary is becoming even more crucial.
We hope Tokyo works tirelessly to convince as many countries as possible to join with the West on the matter of Ukraine. The international community needs to be united in not allowing Russia to do as it wants. Whether Japan can bring ASEAN on board will be a key test of whether a similar united front can be established in the case of China attempting to alter the status quo in the future.
Indonesian policymakers, from the highest to the lowest rung ladder, need to read and discuss with open minds an article that appeared in The Conversation titled “Despite its Pacific ‘step-up,’ Australia is still not listening to the region, new research shows.” Published on Feb. 12, 2020, the article was based on the outcome of policy research by Western Sydney University.
The research aimed to understand the perception of the people of the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Vanuatu about Australia. The in-depth survey helps explain the decision of the Solomon Islands to sign a security pact with China because Australia treats smaller neighbors in the Pacific as “colonies” and demands their absolute loyalty in exchange for economic aid it has poured abundantly on them. They have to follow what Australia wants. The decision to go to China is likely just “the tip of the iceberg.”
Doesn’t it sound like what is going on now in Papua, where aspirations for freedom from Jakarta have been long heard? The sentiment of the respondents in the research will likely be shared by Papuans, who have a strong background and ethnic bond with people in the Pacific. The way Australia behaves is not very different from Jakarta’s attitude toward the Papuan people.
The people in the three Pacific nations perceive Australia as knowing nothing about how to engage successfully as part of the Pacific community. This also applies to the case of Papua. Indonesia must learn from the decision of the Solomon Islands to punish Australia and the United States with a security agreement with China. One day, the Papuan people will also want to punish Indonesia with an equally severe sentence if Jakarta continues to treat them merely as objects instead of the subjects of development.
For as long as I can remember, at least for the last 35 years, the visits of Japanese prime ministers to Indonesia used to highlight bilateral economic relations, including investment and trade.
But the visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Jakarta will take place in a starkly different landscape. The increasing assertiveness of China in the region, the unpredictable behavior of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in threatening the world with its nuclear weapons, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are among the accelerating factors for Japan to act more straightforwardly, including in the area of defense.
Indonesia and the 10-member ASEAN will see a more transparent standpoint and concrete actions from Japan in dealing with the current international issues, including Russia’s invasion and China’s claim over nearly the entire South China Sea. Indonesia needs both China and Japan. Like other countries, Japan also has the right to protect its national interests. A more powerful Japan, including in military terms, can be beneficial for Indonesia because it will provide more choices to secure its national interests.
The United States and China have begun to prepare their respective military alliance in the Asia-Pacific. The United States wants to expand security cooperation in the region by cooperating with Papua New Guinea, following the signing of China’s defense pact with the Solomon Islands on Apr. 19. The pact raised concerns for Australia and the U.S. that Solomon Islands will be a Chinese military base in the South Pacific located less than 2,000 km from the Australian coast.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has announced that he plans to skip next month’s special ASEAN-U.S. Summit in the United States, which the Biden administration intends as a signal of its commitment to Southeast Asia.
In his weekly address aired yesterday morning, Duterte said his main reason for not attending the summit was that he did not want to make decisions that would run counter to the desires of his successor, who will be elected at a presidential election on May 9.
“If it’s a working conference, there might be agreements and commitments that will be made there,” he said, according to Rappler. “I might take a stand that will not be acceptable to the next administration.”
The special U.S.-ASEAN summit will be held in Washington on May 12-13, just three days after millions of Filipinos go to the polls to elect Duterte’s successor, who will take office on June 30.
